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3.1 Perspective 
This paper discusses the deflation of federal government purchases that 
are classified as national defense in the national income and product 
accounts (NIPAs). The paper is divided into five sections. The first 
section, Perspective, reviews the relationship of national defense pur-
chases in the NIP As, the history of the deflation effort, the summary 
results, and their impact on the gross national product. The second 
section. Concepts, Measurements, and Problems, discusses the general 
approaches involved in developing price indexes for defense purchases. 
The third section. Specific Approaches to Defense Purchases, discusses 
the approaches taken in measuring the prices of four types of purchases: 
compensation, new aircraft and missiles, new ship construction, and 
mihtary construction. These types are considered in detail because they 
are of considerable relative importance in defense purchases and pre-
sented significant measurement problems. The fourth section. Compari-
sons with Private Sector Measures of Price Change, compares price 
changes for defense purchases with those for similar goods purchased by 
the private sector. The fifth section. Future Plans, looks ahead at how the 
work can be extended to other types of government purchases. 
3.1.1 Background 
National defense purchases include Department of Defense (DOD) 
mihtary functions, mihtary assistance to other nations, atomic energy 
defense functions, stockpiUng of strategic materials, and certain other 
small items. DOD mihtary functions and mihtary assistance to other 
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nations generally account for over 95% of total national defense pur-
chases. The relationship of national defense purchases to GNP is shown 
in table 3.1. 
Prior to the 1980 GNP benchmark, current-dollar estimates of national 
defense purchases appeared in the NIP As, but constant-dollar estimates 
were not available. The primary reason for this was that price indexes 
applicable to national defense purchases had been lacking. The deflation 
of federal government purchases in the NIP As had been carried out only 
for the total of defense and nondefense purchases. Of necessity, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) placed heavy reUance on compo-
nent price indexes from the Producer Price Index (PPI), which excludes 
goods specific to the mihtary, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
While reliance on the use of the PPI and CPI was necessary and might be 
satisfactory for the total, BEA felt that it certainly would not be satisfac-
tory at a more detailed level of government purchases, particularly for 
national defense purchases. Indeed, the lack of defense purchases in 
constant dollars had long been a serious shortcoming of the NIP As. 
Substantive work on developing constant-dollar estimates of defense 
purchases began in February 1973, when the BEA initiated a study, 
sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to 
determine the requirements and the feasibility of measuring the prices of 
defense purchases (Commerce 1975) The study concluded that the ap-
plication of standard pricing techniques to existing data taken from actual 
DOD transactions would allow the development of price indexes for 
purchases of goods and services related to the defense function. The 
study also concluded that such a measure could be constructed for de-
fense purchases in constant dollars. 
Subsequently, with the urging of the Joint Economic Committee of the 
U.S. Congress, and with the presentation of a proposal prepared by BEA 
in August 1975, DOD entered into an agreement with BEA to conduct 
research and develop measures for estimating defense purchases in con-
stant dollars within the framework of the NIP As, and to publish an 
official defense deflator. That study has now been completed. (Com-
merce 1979) These data have not only improved the accuracy of real GNP 
but they also make it easier for poUcymakers in government to measure 
the attainment of real growth objectives. The president, for example, 
recently estabUshed a real growth objective for the defense budget. 
Without appropriate measures of real defense purchases and of changes 
in the prices of defense purchases, the meeting of such an objective 
cannot be adequately assessed. 
It should be noted that total DOD purchases as well as the estimates by 
major type of product shown in this paper differ from estimates of 
national defense purchases published in the Survey of Current Business. 
These differences arise from the somewhat different coverage of the two 
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able. The data derived in this study were statistically integrated into the 
NIP As at the time of the 1980 benchmark revision. 
3.1.2 Summary Results 
Table 3.2 provides summary measures of DOD purchases in current 
and constant dollars as well as imphcit price deflators for major product 
types and for the total from 1972 to 1978. More detailed results, some of 
which are contained in Section 3.3, are available from BE A. The uni-
verse of DOD purchases was stratified into 26 categories and 87 relatively 
homogeneous subcategories. These subcategories and their relative im-
portances are shown in Appendix B for 1972 and 1977. Table 3.3 shows 
how incorporation of the new DOD series would change various implicit 
price deflators (IPD). 
3.2 Concepts, Measurements, and Problems 
Current-dollar defense purchases consist of compensation of em-
ployees and goods and services purchased from the private sector and 
valued at market prices. Most but not all goods and services purchased 
for national defense are reasonably constant in quahty over time and 
consequently are susceptible to the statistical methodologies associated 
with the price indexes pubhshed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
Even major technological breakthroughs such as jet aircraft can be 
considered new products and can be introduced into price indexes with 
these statistical methodologies. Still, matching desired concepts with 
actual transactions involved the many problems associated with using 
data that have been created for purposes other than incorporation into 
the NIPAs. 
A few measurement conventions are worth noting before specific 
pricing procedures are taken up. For many types of defense contracts the 
value of defense goods produced but not delivered is reflected as an 
increment in business inventories. When these goods are delivered to 
DOD there is an offsetting increase to national defense purchases such 
that GNP is not changed. Thus, to the extent that defense goods had 
entered private inventories, a current period delivery to DOD should 
have no current period effect on GNP as a whole because of the offsetting 
effects of the decrease in business inventories and the increase in national 
defense purchases. In principle, constant-dollar GNP as well as current-
dollar GNP is to remain unchanged when defense goods are shipped from 
business inventories. The defense goods treated in such fashion are 
durable goods with long production times, such as aircraft and tanks, but 
ships and mihtary construction are important exceptions. 
Another measurement convention arising from the structure of the 
NIPAs distinguishes the value of transfer payments such as retirement 
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ments are considered financial flows that are additions to personal income 
and do not represent an increment to the value of current production. 
The measurement of current-dollar defense purchases is also compli-
cated because of numerous intra-DOD transactions that appear in DOD 
financial reports and would cause double counts in the NIPAs if not 
removed. Such transactions are consohdated into a single DOD financial 
statement so that only the value of transactions with the private sector 
and the compensation of employees enter the NIPAs. 
3.2.1 Measurement of Price Change 
The NIPAs concept of valuing purchases at market prices has been 
interpreted to mean transaction prices, that is, the price that was actually 
paid to a supplier for a specified good or service. 
The measurement of price change for defense purchases as defined in 
the NIPAs is difficult for many reasons. One difficulty arises because 
many prices are frequently unknown, even after the good is delivered, 
because of cost-sharing agreements and disputed costs. In addition, at 
any point in time there exists an array of values to which the term "price" 
is or can be applied. There are list prices, order prices, shipment prices, 
fixed prices, escalated prices, and many other types (National Bureau of 
Economic Research 1961, pp. 32-34; Council on Wage and Price Stability 
1977, pp. 1-9-20; Department of Defense 1975, pp. 2C1-2C27). BEA has 
chosen to use those prices, by whatever name, which are closest to the 
price finally paid. For example, where a good is bought under a firm-
fixed-price contract the contract prices could be used. However, if the 
contract had an escalator clause, then the escalated contract price finally 
paid by DOD would be used. 
Another measurement problem of pricing goods arises from the need 
to price repetitive purchases, that is, a good with an identical physical 
specification purchased in different time periods. For many goods this is 
difficult because many types of available records do not separate recur-
ring and nonrecurring components of a purchase. Nonrecurring compo-
nents of a purchase might include technical drawings that will appear only 
in the initial purchase contract. These drawings could be priced as a 
separately specified item, or, alternatively, their value could be spread 
over all units made from those technical drawings. If such nonrecurring 
items are not excluded from contracts where a good with a fixed specifica-
tion is being priced, they can seriously distort subsequent price change. 
Consequently, in order to price the identically specified good over time it 
is necessary to strip out such nonrecurring items from contracts. 
Defense purchases are typically for components of a complete good. A 
round of ammunition, for example, may be purchased with separate 
contractors supplying the metal casing, fuse, powder, and assembly of the 
finished round. Virtually every durable good is bought in pieces that are 151 Deflation of Defense Purchases 
provided to a prime contractor who assembles the components into a 
ship, tank, missile, or aircraft. In addition, a single contractor may have 
numerous contracts related to the assembled good, for example, for 
research and development, technical services, and production compo-
nents. Each contract is considered by BE A as the basis for a separate 
transaction that is individually priced. 
Many separable goods and services may be bought as part of one 
contract with one contractor, but not every item within a contract is 
necessarily priced by BE A. It is not possible or necessary to price every 
item within a contract, particularly if prices can be expected to move 
similarly. Therefore, prices were generally obtained for finished items 
that were separably specified within contracts. The number of pricing 
specifications that were directly priced is shown in Appendix C for each of 
the 26 categories into which DOD purchases were stratified. 
3.2.2 Specification versus Functional Pricing 
Specification pricing and functional pricing are the two major 
approaches to measuring price change (United Nations 1977, p. 11). 
Specification pricing, which conforms to other government statistics 
(e.g., PPI), is the general approach used to measure price change in the 
NIP As. 
Specification pricing defines a commodity by its physical characteris-
tics; functional pricing, in contrast, defines a commodity by attributes 
that serve a particular purpose regardless of physical characteristics. 
What is a quantity change under the specification pricing approach will 
frequently be a price change under the functional approach. 
A specification pricing approach was used to adjust for quality change 
in DOD purchases. It is similar to the technique used by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics for the PPI and CPI (Commerce 1975, pp. 41 ff.). A 
change in specifications is the key to the determination of quaUty change; 
once the existence of quality change has been determined, it must be 
evaluated. The value of a quality change is defined as the production cost 
associated with the specification change. For example, if a combat boot is 
changed at some cost to make it waterproof, a changed specification, then 
the value of the quality change is defined as the cost of the specification 
change. In calculating the pure price change in combat boots, it is 
necessary to adjust for the improved quality. It is important to remember 
that the valuation of the quality change is based on the cost and not the 
usefulness of the quality change to the user. 
"Costless quahty change" is a special problem that was treated in this 
study with the traditional approach. If the quality of a good has improved 
but there is no associated change in factor cost, the valuation of the 
quality change is defined as zero. If the quality of an item has improved 
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no quality change had occurred. The price change is a simple comparison 
of prices. By making no quality adjustment and using the two unadjusted 
prices, a price decrease and unchanged quality are reflected. 
3.2.3 Other Measurement Problems 
Many measurement problems are of concern because the nature of 
actual purchases makes implementation of the concepts difficult. For 
example, in some cases quantities could not be associated with certain 
types of purchases, primarily because they were of a unique nature. The 
output of research and development purchases could not be specification 
priced in quantifiable units. Space satellites were another defense pur-
chase that were not directly priced because rapid technological advances 
of satellites have brought about numerous physical differences that make 
specification pricing very difficult. 
Another measurement problem arises because of what is known as the 
"warm production base" or purchase of readiness. Briefly, a warm pro-
duction base reflects a situation where DOD buys a small quantity of a 
good from a contractor at an extremely high price in order to maintain a 
production capability in case the good is needed in large quantities in the 
future. Excess capacity in the aircraft industry has been the subject of a 
recent study and cited by some as an example of a ''hidden" and pervasive 
warm production base (Department of Defense 1977ft). This situation 
occurs principally, however, in the areas of unique defense goods. Iden-
tification of a readiness purchase is not always easy. They were not 
specifically identified and treated in this study. 
The base year for price deflators in the accounts is 1972. However, the 
selection of this or any base period will present problems if all prices are 
not at equilibrium. Those prices that have not reached their equilibrium 
position are over- or underweighted relative to the prices that are at 
equihbrium in the base period. This problem is found in any statistical 
series but is accentuated in the case of new weapon system purchases. As 
production of a new system increases, these purchases generally experi-
ence sharp decreases in the quantity of labor inputs per unit and in output 
prices. That is, cost and price per unit display what is known as a learning 
curve. Any weapon system that is introduced during or slightly before the 
base period will be overweighted in the series because its base period 
price will be unusually high. 
3.3 Specific Approaches to Defense Purchases 
The universe of purchases was stratified into 26 categories and 87 
relatively homogeneous subcategories. These subcategories and their 
relative importances are shown in Appendix B for 1972 and 1977. Var-153 Deflation of Defense Purchases 
ious approaches to deflating these categories reflect the nature of the 
purchases, available information, and limits of measurement techniques. 
In order to illustrate a range of problems, results are discussed for five 
major items: aircraft, missiles, compensation of employees, ships, and 
miUtary construction. 
3.3.1 Aircraft 
The aircraft subcategories discussed in this section are those relating to 
the separately purchased components of new aircraft procurements such 
as the airframe, engine, and electronic equipment. 
The approach used to measure price change of new production aircraft 
was to use specification pricing techniques on components such as air-
frames and engines. Major components such as engines are usually 
purchased by DOD from separate contractors and are furnished to the 
airframe contractor for installation. Such components, plus the airframe 
and assembly, were separately priced to develop deflators for purchases 
of aircraft. 
The three most important characteristics determining price change for 
military aircraft appear to be the number of years a particular model has 
been in production, the quantity produced in a fiscal year (including 
non-DOD, i.e., foreign military sales), and the specific component group 
(engines, electronics, etc.). 
The age of an aircraft system influences price change because a 'iearn-
ing curve" dominates price behavior early in the life of a particular model 
or specification. The learning curve reflects the decreasing costs per unit 
of production associated with a repetitive operation as the operation is 
continued. These decreasing costs may apply to several inputs, but they 
are usually expressed in terms of manhours. 
Learning curve theory is not new (Wright 1936). Basically, learning 
curve theory states that over a wide range of output marginal man-hour 
requirements per unit can be described by a straight line on log-log paper. 
Learning curves vary from aircraft to aircraft and from specification to 
specification. 
As the number produced continues to rise, the rate of decline in unit 
costs will gradually diminish and the unit price approaches a constant. 
Regardless of the particular learning curve, by the time production 
reaches the one-hundredth unit, man-hour requirements per unit are 
nearly constant. This point can be reached by high production rates for a 
short period of time, or low production rates for a longer time. After this 
point, the price changes of labor and materials will ordinarily increase as 
inflation more than offsets the effect of increases in the productivity of 
labor. 
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ordered in a contract. Changes in the quantity of aircraft purchased in a 
contract have significant effects on unit prices, even if the quantity does 
not accrue to DOD. "There will be a savings on the order of $90 to $100 
million to the U.S. Air Force fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1981 F-15 
procurements if potential Foreign Military Sales to Israel and Saudi 
Arabia are consummated and current estimates of delivery schedules and 
buy quantities remain unchanged" (United States Senate 19786, 
p. 4611). Low production rates are typical of current DOD aircraft 
procurements. Low production rates keep production lines going, avoid 
start-up and close-down costs, which can be substantial, and keep pro-
curement costs within annual DOD budgets. On a unit cost basis, how-
ever, low production rates are costly and reduce possibilities for automa-
tion. 
The third characteristic affecting price change is the specific compo-
nent group, that is, airframe, engines, or electronics. Price changes of 
these major component groups differ because these components are 
produced with significantly different mixes of labor and capital equip-
ment and reflect differential price movements in the mix of materials. 
Direct consideration of these characteristics in the sample selection 
procedure could result in more efficient samples. However, it was easier 
to price more aircraft models than it was to develop an efficient sample. 
New aircraft were initially stratified into air force, army, and navy 
purchases, and a sample (shown below) was systematically selected with 
probability proportional to the estimated value of deliveries. However, 
the sample is now judgmental and is virtually the universe of new aircraft 
purchases. Each new aircraft model entering production is added to the 
sample with certainty. The specifications selected for pricing within a new 
aircraft, such as the airframe, engines, and electrical equipment, gener-
ally account for most of the value of the system, 
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The value of delivered aircraft, as required for the NIP As, is not 
available from any known source. Therefore, the current-dollar value 
of new aircraft purchases was estimated for each quarter based upon 
the value of deliveries of the priced components (Commerce 1979, 
pp. 57-58). 
A current-dollar value of deliveries was developed for each directly 
priced component from the product of delivered units times the compo-
nent unit price. Within each system this value of deliveries was blown up 
to the total value of the system to account for any nonpriced components 
in that system. For systems not in the sample the value of deliveries was 
estimated as being proportional to those systems that were priced within 
the military service. Since most systems are included in the sample, the 
value of unpriced systems is very small relative to the total value of 
purchases for aircraft. 
Aircraft components are frequently purchased at prices that are not 
fully known until the rewards, penalties, and engineering changes are 
determined and negotiated at contract completion. The prices generally 
used were ones which reflect the ultimate total payment by DOD for a 
good with a given physical specification. Estimated prices at completion 
were derived from data routinely found in contract control documenta-
tion and used whenever they were available. Although these prices at 
completion are only estimates at any point in time, they are frequently 
the best of the available prices because they reflect profit adjustments and 
contractual cost-sharing agreements. 
A combination of reports was vital to ensuring that the values used to 
develop prices related to goods with the same physical specification. 
Estimated prices at completion were derived from Cost Performance 
Reports (CPR) after prorating cost sharings, profit, and overhead across 
the total contract. Cost Information Papers were then used to identify 
nonrecurring costs that are not shown in CPRs and which, if not re-
moved, would distort the price change. 
The previously described specification pricing approach was the basis 
for the quality adjustment guidelines applied to military aircraft. These 
guidelines are shown in Appendix D. The results of quality adjusting 
aircraft of the same model (e.g., A-lOA) were surprisingly slight. While 
the number of engineering changes was great, especially for new models, 
most changes did not require quality adjustments and those that did made 
only a slight difference. It was found that most engineering changes did 
not involve a physical change to the specific item priced, or were under-
taken to remedy a design defect, or were done at no change to the 
contract price. Contracts frequently had clauses that provide for changes 
at no additional cost if they were below a certain threshold, that is, 
$25,000. A great deal of the costs usually announced with engineering 
changes involved nonrecurring items that were not priced, that is, tool-156 Richard C. Ziemer/Karl D. Galbraith 
ing, training, changes to technical manuals, special tools, and modifica-
tion kits for aircraft already delivered. Such nonrecurring items were 
treated as separate purchases. 
Although the values involved in quahty adjusting an existing aircraft 
model were generally insignificant, when a new model replaces another 
the differences in costs are substantial. The process of introducing new 
aircraft involves a procedure known as linking. 
Introducing the price of a new model is an extension of the quality 
adjustment problem that confronts all compilers of price indexes. The 
following discussion illustrates the methodology as it was applied to the 
Hnking of the F-15A to the F-4E. 
The F-15 replaced the F-4. Often it is not clear what the new product is 
replacing, and this obviously can greatly complicate an attempt to link a 
new product to specific existing products. However, according to the 
DOD, 'The F-15 is an advanced tactical fighter developed for the air 
superiority mission. It will replace the F-4 as the primary air superiority 
aircraft" (Department of Defense 1911a, p. 22). 
The F-15 had a substantially higher cost, and the question arose as to 
how much of the higher cost represented quahty improvement. The F-15 
clearly outperforms the F-4. The F-15, for example, has a hghter basic 
takeoff weight, shorter takeoff distance, faster sea level rate of climb, 
quicker time to climb, quicker acceleration time, higher maximum ceil-
ing, higher sustained load factor, slower approach speed. When there is a 
quality improvement at a higher cost, such as between the F-15 and F-4, 
then the correct procedure is to value the quality difference and Unk the 
two weapon systems, component by component. Linking allows only that 
part of price change not associated with quality change to be reflected as a 
price increase. The following is an example of linking in which prices that 
had been used in the past were quality adjusted so as to be comparable 
with current period prices. (This is called ''back price" linking as distinct 




























Between periods 2 and 3 the unadjusted price increased 60 cents, with 
20 cents judged to be a price increase and 40 cents attributed to quality 157 Deflation of Defense Purchases 
change. Under the back price method of linking, the period 2 price is 
made $5.40 and the current price is left unchanged, so that between 
periods 2 and 3 only a 20-cent price increase is shown in the index. 
The value of the quahty difference between the F-15 and F-4 is defined 
as the difference in overlap prices in a particular time period. By valuing 
the difference in models, it is possible to relate the two specifications in 
terms of each other. These prices should reflect not only the same general 
price level but also the same relative position on the respective learning 
curves if serious problems are to be avoided. F-4Es had been delivered by 
the hundreds before the contract for the first F-15 A was signed in 1972. 
The same point on the learning curve of the F-15A is the proper basis for 
overlap price measurement of the quality difference. However, in the 
absence of such an overlap, the one-hundredth unit of the new model was 
compared to one of the last units of the old model. Both models are 
represented by points where the learning curve has flattened and addi-
tional production is judged to have relatively Httle effect on the unit price 
change. 
The overlap time period used for valuing the quahty difference was 
taken to be the time at which the first production contract for an F-15 was 
signed. The F-4E price in the overlap period had the virtue of being an 
actual transaction price. The F-15 A price, however, had to be derived 
from estimates of future production costs. This calculation was carried 
out with the DOD estimates of future program costs that are used for 
their own cost analyses and budgeting for the Congress. This was done for 
each component; in addition, the inflation factors built into the DOD 
estimates were removed. What remained is an estimated F-15 A compo-
nent specification price that represents a similar state of learning for the 
time period of the last F-4E. 
The table below shows the airframe deflator for the F-4E and F-15A 
without adjustment for quality differences and with the adjustment. The 
Total columns are weighted averages of the F-4E and F-15 A series using 
the quantity of airframes delivered in each year as weights. The index for 
the F-15A without quahty adjustment is based on the functional pricing 
approach, that is, one F-15 A is the same quantity of airframe as one 
F-4E. Because the initial F-15As that were delivered in 1974 were ap-
proximately 3^2 times as expensive as the F-4Es, they enter with an index 
level of 433.3. Adjusting for quality by the procedures described above 
reduces the F-15A index to 296.8 in 1974. Approximately 40% of the 
difference in cost between F-4Es and F-15As in 1974 was considered a 
quality improvement, the remainder a price difference. It should be 
noted that the percentage decline in price for the F-15As from 1974 to 
1977 is the same in both series and mostly represents movement along the 























































The results of pricing new aircraft are shown in table 3.4. The pro-
nounced contrasts between the IPD movements of navy and air force 
aircraft especially from 1972 to 1975 are the result of the introduction of 
new weapon systems. The navy IPDs declined because the first deliveries 
of the F-14A, S-3A, and E-2C happened to occur during the base year. 
This caused the base year prices for navy aircraft to be exceptionally high 
on average, because actual deliveries were those of aircraft produced 
early in their respective learning curves. This overstates the constant-
dollar value of subsequent deliveries of F-14As, S-3As, and E-2Cs to the 
navy. The air force series, in contrast, had relatively low base year prices 
because only the older systems were still being delivered in 1972. There-
fore, the air force aircraft index moved upward after 1972 when the first 
deliveries began of the F-15A and A-lOA, which were high on their 
learning curves. The sharp changes in the IPDs for the air force in the 
fourth quarter of 1973 and navy in the second quarter of 1976 were caused 
by a change in the mix of deliveries of aircraft components with quite 
different price indexes. 
3.3.2 Missiles 
Missile series were developed using the same concepts and measure-
ment conventions as aircraft. The sample selection shown below and the 
derivation of current-dollar estimates and prices were also similar. The 
missiles subcategories included in this section are for components of new 
missiles. The unit of purchase appropriate to measure the price change of 
missiles was determined by the contractual procedures used by DOD to 
purchase different missiles. Although some missiles are purchased as 
complete units, for example, army's Dragon and air force's Maverick, 
most missiles are purchased as components. These components, such as 
the missile body, guidance and control unit, and rocket motor are assem-
bled into a final product by the main contractor or by a faciUty owned and 
operated by the federal government. In all cases, the particular items 

































The implicit price deflators for missiles shown in table 5 were quite 
surprising. The army and marine corps missile series showed sharp de-
cUnes, because early contracts of the Dragon and Tow systems had high 
base year prices similar to those of navy aircraft. However, the decHne 
was further accentuated because of price competition for relatively large 
numbers of assembly-line production units. Normally the DOD buys 
from a single contractor, but DOD is sometimes able to seek a second 
source for missile production because the number of units involved is so 
much greater than for aircraft. The army realized large price saving on 
the Dragon as did the air force and navy on Sparrow missiles, because two 
contractors were competing for the production contracts. Thus, missile 
prices moved sharply downward because of both the effect of learning 
and competition. 
3.3.3 Compensation 
Compensation of civilian and military employees is the largest category 
of DOD purchases. It consists of wages, salaries, supplements, benefits, 
and payments in kind to DOD employees. 
Purchases of compensation, like other goods and services, are 
specification priced. The units of compensation being purchased by the 
government are hours worked with specified characteristics. The charac-
teristics of education and experience of the employee have been deter-
mined to be the major price-determining characteristics of employees in 
the U.S. economy. It should be noted that Denison (1974) also used sex 
of the employee as a price-determining characteristic, but this was not 
deemed necessary for federal government compensation because of the 
antidiscrimination poHcies in effect during the period under considera-
tion. Any violations of these poUcies would represent misclassifications 
that were not identifiable in the data used. The correct base price mea-
sure then is the base period average compensation for each hour worked 
by individuals who are stratified by education and experience. Since 
current data on the education and experience of DOD employees are not 
available, proxy measures for these characteristics were developed 
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The Civil Service classification system (and to a considerable extent the 
wage grade system for blue-collar workers) provides a built-in measure of 
these strata because requirements for each grade are based on the educa-
tion or experience of the employee. In addition, promotions to steps 
within a grade reflect additional employee experience. "Grade creep," a 
gradual increase in the average grade of employees that is not commensu-
rate with their education and experience represents an overstatement of 
employee ''quality." However, no data were available on the extent of 
this or other misclassifications. This study adhered to the NIP A conven-
tion of making no adjustments for changes in employee productivity. 
Employment data on civilian employees were available by grade and 
step for each time period. Data on hours worked were not available, so 
data on "weekly hours paid for" were substituted. These were appUed to 
the employment data to generate the number of hours paid for in each 
quarter. Data were developed on the average hourly compensation by 
grade and step for the base period and were multipHed by the number of 
hours in each grade and step to develop the quarterly estimate of hours 
paid for valued at base period prices. 
A similar but somewhat modified procedure was used for military 
personnel. Employment was stratified by rank and by years of service as a 
measure of education and experience. Adjustments were not made for 
average hours worked, since military personnel are considered to be on 
duty 24 hours a day, except during actual periods of leave. 
Certain allowances (e.g., basic allowance for quarters, uniform and 
clothing allowance, family separation allowance) were treated as part of 
basic pay; changes in rates for these allowances appear as price changes. 
It was assumed that increases in these allowances do not relate to experi-
ence and education and, thus, do not reflect increased employee quahty. 
Using this same assumption, the value of food and clothing furnished to 
employees were also treated as part of basic pay. However, certain types 
of pay (e.g., flight pay, jump pay) represent additional training or experi-
ence of the employee. These types of pay are deflated separately and 
added to real compensation to reflect the additional quality to DOD. 
The military and civilian compensation IPDs are quite different (table 
3.6). Although the military and general schedule (GS) civiUans have been 
given the same basic salary increases, the total civiUan IPDs increased 
more rapidly because of the impact of higher pay raises to ''wage-board" 
or blue-collar workers. Wage-board workers are given increases on the 
basis of local wage surveys; this has resulted in substantially greater 
increases than those given to military personnel and GS civiHans. 
3.3.4 New Ship Construction 
New ships, like other major weapon systems, are generally purchased 
as components. Major components, such as propulsion systems and 
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delivered to a private shipyard for integration with the hull. The private 
shipyard constructs the hull, procures some equipment, and installs the 
government furnished equipment (GFE) to complete the ship for deliv-
ery to the navy. 
Although purchases of GFE components were separately priced and 
deflated with standard techniques, ship construction at private shipyards 
was deflated with a method of pricing different from that used for the 
other weapon systems. Ship construction is included in the NIP As on a 
work put-in-place rather than on a delivery basis, that is, work on ships is 
recorded on the books of contractors as sales as the work progresses. 
With other weapon systems involving lengthy production periods, the 
work done is charged to inventory, which is Uquidated only when the 
completed item has been delivered. 
Most attempts to develop prices for ship construction in the past have 
rehed on an input approach. The input method has two drawbacks. First, 
since the output is not being measured, it is virtually impossible to 
measure the quahty change in the product being produced. Second, any 
changes in productivity are difficult to measure and incorporate into the 
estimate of price change. In order to circumvent these problems the BE A 
decided to select the physical design of several ship models that were kept 
constant, that is, ''frozen." The ''frozen" physical design became the 
pricing specification that was repriced over time at shipyards. In this way 
the many engineering and design changes that occur during ship construc-
tion were assumed to experience the same price change as the basic 
design. The "frozen" ship approach overcame the drawbacks of a tech-
nique based on a fixed set and quantity of inputs. The problems of 
productivity change and capital/labor substitutions were overcome be-
cause the constant specifically defined output permitted variations in 
inputs. 
The exact specification for a frozen ship was developed by BEA in 
conjunction with selected private shipyards to ensure that the data on 
labor hours, labor rates, materials, and overhead costs related to an 
appropriate design that could be reconstructed over time. The ship 
models whose designs were frozen were an attack submarine (SSN 688 
class), surface combatants (FFG-7 class and DD-963 class), and support 
ship (auxiUary oiler). Once the basic hours, labor rates, materials, and 
overhead costs were developed for the frozen ship, these data were then 
reestimated in each succeeding time period to calculate price change for a 
fixed output. 
Total labor hours changed as a result of skill levels at shipyards and the 
impact of regulations imposed by the Environmental Protection Admin-
istration (EPA), Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), and the navy. The overhead rates used were those prevaiUng in 
particular time periods at private shipyards for work on navy ships. 
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not developed because similar materials were bought infrequently and to 
different specifications. Most material costs were associated with major 
equipment items such as propulsion turbines, reduction gears, and gen-
eral classes of goods such as pumps. The contract prices that shipyards 
actually negotiated with producers of major pieces of equipment and the 
navy are frequently escalated by the movement of PPIs. Consequently, 
until a contract is renegotiated, the price change to DOD for many 
important pieces of equipment will be equal to the movement of particu-
lar PPIs. In these instances, weighting of PPIs provided the correct 
measurement of price change for these items to the shipyard. 
A total frozen ship price should include not only the cost of labor, 
material, and overhead but also profits. Profit, however, relates to the 
completed ship, and the ship's actual price remains uncertain until deliv-
ery is made and the rewards, penalties, engineering changes, and any 
claims are settled. Moreover, the frozen ship methodology assumes that 
shipyards are compensated for their costs. If shipyards are not fully 
compensated because of disputes over cost-sharing or claims made at 
time of settlement, a frozen ship index will probably overstate the actual 
price change to the navy. The overstatement, however, relates only to the 
difference between reported shipyard ship construction costs and the 
amount paid under the navy contract including any claim settlement. If 
claims are not reflected in the frozen ship data, then the price change to 
the navy will be understated to the extent that final claims will be greater 
than anticipated. As a result of these considerations, no exphcit incor-
poration of profit in frozen ship prices was made, and the direction of any 
measurement error is unclear at this time. 
The price change for the ship category was the net result of significantly 
different deflators for new ship construction at shipyards and GFE as 
shown in table 3.7. The relatively low deflator for ship GFE is attributed 
to the high relative importance of electronic equipment. The prices of 
many pieces of electronic equipment have decUned as a result of new 
technology and lower labor inputs. The upward price movement of new 
ship construction reflected declining productivity at several shipyards. 
3.3.4 Military Construction 
This category includes all construction purchased by the military ser-
vices on contract from the military construction appropriation. Construc-
tion activities included in other categories are those performed in-house 
by DOD employees, government purchases of construction materials, 
family housing, and the construction portion of the Minuteman Force 
Modernization Program. 
Purchases of construction in the NIPAs are recorded on a work put-in-
place basis. Thus DOD is assumed to purchase the construction as it is 
performed, even though they do not take title until the contract is 
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contractor on the basis of an estimate of work completed. While at any 
given time these payments will not exactly correspond to the total amount 
of work that has been completed, they are a good approximation. 
The definition and measurement of an appropriate price for construc-
tion purchases poses many difficult problems. As was indicated in the 
pricing of ships, input pricing is generally considered to be unsatisfac-
tory in that it does not allow for changes in the productivity of labor, 
capital/labor substitution, or output quality change. 
An attempt was made to bypass these problems and directly price the 
unit of construction that was being purchased by DOD. The price per unit 
(i.e., square foot, linear foot, cubic yard, etc.) of a specified type of 
construction (e.g., barracks) was defined to be the appropriate market 
price of construction purchased by DOD. Generally, physical changes 
that were made during the construction period did not affect either the 
quality or function of the structure. This is because the approach of DOD 
to construction is to specify functional requirements rather than to 
enumerate detailed material or structural specifications. For example, 
the specifications for troop housing center around the number of bath-
rooms for each intended occupant and requirements such as sound-
proofing. Deviations from the basic physical specification which affected 
utilization, for example, a bathroom for every two occupants in place of 
one for every four, would require quaHty adjustment. The average unit 
price, therefore, accurately measures the purchase price of a particular 
construction type to DOD. The measure of price change derived from 
these data reflects any changes in productivity, capital/labor substitution, 
material substitution, etc., that occur during the construction period as 
well as changing profit margins. 
It should be noted that the regional differences in factor costs for the 
same specification are considered price change to DOD. However, dif-
ferences in construction performance requirements based on climate 
(e.g., a storage facility for JP-4 in Alaska vs. Southern California) were 
considered quality differences. 
Generally construction was purchased on fixed-price contracts; there-
fore, the price was constant for each project through the duration of the 
construction period. Only changes to the work being performed or legal 
claims altered the price for a given project. Wherever feasible, the final 
price paid for a project was used. This price, calculated on a per unit 
basis, included all changes or modifications during the life of the project. 
Mihtary construction purchases were stratified into nine classes (see 
table 3.17). Reports on selected projects were not always available within 
these classes, and it was assumed that within each class the project prices 
moved similarly. 
The number of units of construction (square feet or cubic yards) 
put-in-place per quarter was determined by dividing total units by the 
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many cases, construction started or ended during a quarter rather than at 
the beginning or end. Therefore, the nearest one-third of a quarter was 
determined from the starting month, and quarter units were allocated for 
one-third or two-thirds of the total. 
Expenditures by project were estimated by multiplying the total units 
put-in-place per quarter on the project by the unit price of the project. 
Total units per quarter and total current-dollar expenditures for that 
quarter were aggregated by class and divided to arrive at a weighted 
average price per quarter stated in dollars per unit put-in-place during 
that quarter. These average prices by class were used to develop price 
indexes and then to deflate the current-dollar estimates of the value of 
construction put-in-place. 
Unit price differences relating to geographic area or to project size 
were assumed to be price differences and not unit quaUty differences. 
The concept of quality change used in construction may be illustrated by 
some specific examples. If the requirements for troop housing were 
changed from open dormitory sleeping facilities on each floor to private 
rooms for each occupant, a quality change occurred. If, however, brick 
exterior walls were used in one facility and concrete block with stucco 
walls were used in another, there would be no quaUty difference if both 
met construction standards with respect to load-bearing, sound-
deadening, etc. 
Table 3.8 shows implicit price deflators for military construction, which 
has just been discussed, as well as the somewhat more comprehensive 
category ''structures." 
3.4 Comparisons with Measures of Price Change in the Private Sector 
In the short run, price changes of goods purchased by the DOD need 
not be the same as those for similar goods priced in the PPI. These 
potential differences provided one basis for BEA concern that use of 
PPIs might provide unreliable estimates of national defense purchases in 
constant dollars. 
The DOD and government in general are considered by the private 
sector as a distinct market, with its own set of paperwork and special 
specifications, together with political and social overtones. Products may 
be similar, but they may be subject to different demands purchased in 
different lot sizes under different terms of sale and with different spec-
ifications as compared to those purchased in civilian markets. Therefore 
price change in this market may be quite different from the price change 
experience of the private marketplace. Although the price-determining 
forces in civilian and military markets are different in a number of 
respects, they are similar in other respects. For example, materials and 
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products is roughly the same, and manufacturers may use the same or 
similar capital equipment in the production of these products. 
There has been little information available to test whether price in-
dexes representing goods in civilian markets can be relied upon to repre-
sent price trends of articles purchased for military programs. There have 
been fewer doubts concerning goods Hke missiles and tanks, which have 
no civilian counterparts. The use of civihan market price trends for 
materials (steel, engines, chemicals, etc.) and labor rates as inputs were 
discussed earher in the paper. So long as price trends of defense pur-
chases had to be estimated through proxy indexes such as the PPI, which, 
by definition, excludes sales of unique mihtary purchases, the questions 
remained largely unresolved. However, when the BEA began to con-
struct price indexes for military purchases, the question could be 
answered at least in part. 
The comparisons made herein are limited but indicate the nature of the 
problem. Comparisons are made between PPIs and DOD price indexes 
for petroleum products, citrus fruits, clothing, and hot rolled carbon 
steel; broader indexes are used for construction. The PPI has been the 
subject of numerous reviews (Stigler and Kindahl 1970; Council on Wage 
and Price Stability 1977). One conclusion of the COWPS report that the 
data reaffirm is that ''the scope and coverage of the body of wholesale 
price data are not adequate for the uses made of the data." 
The BEA IPDs are constructed by means of the Paasche formula—that 
is, weights for each current quarter are used in the calculation of the index 
change from the base period (1972) to the current period. The PPIs, on 
the other hand, utilize the Laspeyres formula whereby weights are fixed 
for relatively long periods of time (five or more years). In order to remove 
the effect of different price index formulas, the BEA indexes were 
recalculated at the lowest feasible level as Laspeyres indexes using fixed 
weights. 
All of the price indexes in this section are fixed weighted by base period 
quantities, as is usual for the Laspeyres price index formulation used by 
the PPI. Other differences in the methods used by the PPI could not be 
adjusted for in the DOD data available for this paper. The PPI, for 
example, frequently uses price as of a single day of each month. The 
DOD data are generally an average of the transation prices for specifica-
tion for an entire quarter. The PPI generally represents sellers' prices; the 
DOD data usually refer to buyers' prices. Further, the PPI makes the 
seller or buyer part of the pricing specification, that is, if company X 
provides a price for specification y, the price of company X for Y is only 
compared to itself. In calculating transaction prices for DOD, the seller 
was not part of the pricing specification because the objective was to 
measure what DOD had to pay for the same specification in different 
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are monthly, quarterly indexes for each commodity were computed as 
simple averages of the three monthly indexes and then put on the refer-
ence base of the corresponding BEA series. Despite these differences, a 
comparison with the PPI is made because they are the government 
statistics used to represent price change in the private sector, and histor-
ically they have been used imphcitly to estimate national defense pur-
chases, which are part of federal purchases in constant dollars in the 
pubUshed national income and product accounts. 
3.4.1 Petroleum Products 
Petroleum products are a major nondurable purchase of the DOD and 
an especially good series in the PPI, since petroleum prices were over-
hauled to reflect (recent upgrading that introduced direct pricing of) 
major market transactions of refiners. Regular gasoHne, kerosene base 
jet fuel, and diesel fuel are purchased by the DOD and are also priced in 
the PPI. Each of these goods is rather homogeneous so that a comparison 
of the PPI and prices of defense purchases is greatly faciUtated. 
Price indexes and specifications are shown in tables 3.9 and 3.10, 
respectively. Figure 3.1 shows the price change for regular gasoHne. The 
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Fig. 3.1 Comparison of price indexes for regular gasoline (July-
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indexes were put on a third quarter of 1973 (73-III) base because compa-
rable data at this level of detail were not available for earlier periods. 
The PPI data are collected as monthly sales (revenue and volume) for 
each of the Census Bureau regions for specified products from refiners 
and deep water terminal operators. The use of monthly sales data results 
in a one-month reporting lag to the BLS. This lag was removed in the 
comparisons. The PPI fixes the weight of these petroleum products below 
the product specification level, that is, each seller of these petroleum 
products has its weight fixed at a regional level regardless of actual sales in 
current time periods. 
The DOD average specification price, in contrast, is a delivered price 
(the quotient of disbursements divided by delivered quantities) for the 
national stock number specification in each quarter. Available DOD data 
did not allow fixing weights at a regional and company level as is done in 
the PPI so that the effect of such weighting differences is unknown. 
The price indexes for these petroleum products indicate that the price 
change to the DOD was much greater than it was to industrial and 
commercial consumers in the PPI. 
The DOD began having problems obtaining bids for petroleum 
products as early as September 1972, a full year before the Arab embargo 
of October 1973. Growth of refinery capacity slowed in the United States 
during the late 1960s, in part from decUnes in domestic crude oil produc-
tion capacity and environmental legislation. By late 1972, many domestic 
refiners no longer had surplus refining capacity. Quantities offered by 
domestic refiners to DOD for delivery in the first half of 1973 fell far 
below historic experience. Foreign offers did not exhibit a similar trend 
until the second half of 1973. As nonmilitary demand rose and surplus 
refining capacity diminished, price freeze regulations enacted in May 
1973 froze price levels for petroleum products to the mihtary at levels far 
below those in commercial markets (United States House 1974). Many 
contracts that had been negotiated at much higher prices for delivery 
beginning in July 1973 were faced with a government edict to roll prices 
back to the level in earlier contracts. Consequently, many suppliers 
exercised their legal right to refuse delivery, and DOD was forced to 
draw down their inventories. The embargo imposed by the Arab states in 
October 1973 further reduced supply, and DOD inventories dropped 
sharply. The inventory reductions halted in December 1973 as a result of 
temporary restrictions on consumption and increasing supply resulting 
from legislative allocations. DOD was then able to start rebuilding inven-
tories, but at considerably higher prices than earUer. 
Measures of price change say nothing about average prices. This fact is 
often forgotten and is especially reveaUng for these petroleum products. 
Average prices of regular gasoline sold to the DOD and commercial 













Both sets of prices exclude taxes and include transportation charges to 
the consumer which can change over time. The absolute difference in the 
price change of regular gasoline seems insignificant given the measure-
ment differences of the two series. The DOD price index increased more 
than the PPI because its base period price was lower. The same absolute 
change, therefore, yields a greater percentage change to DOD. 
Jet fuel purchased by DOD had a smaller price change than that 
reflected in the PPI. Both the airlines and the DOD are large consumers 
eagerly sought by refiners. JP-4 is a kerosene base jet fuel that is virtually 
the same as reflected in the PPI. JP-5 is a naptha base jet fuel which is 
made about equally from gasohne and kerosene components of crude 
petroleum and accounts for most of DOD jet fuel. JP-5 experienced price 
change less than that of the kerosene base jet fuel and greater than that 
for regular gasohne, which is what one would expect. 
Average prices for jet fuel are shown below for 73-III and 78-IV in 
cents-per-gallon. Both series include some transportation charges and 
73-III 78-IV Difference 
PPI (kerosene base) 12.5 39.2 26,7 
JP-4 (kerosene base) 13.2 38.7 25.5 
JP.5 (naptha base) 14.2 39.5 25.3 
exclude taxes. Despite the effect of different methodologies, a one-cent 
per gallon difference in price change for jet fuel is substantial. The impact 
of the price increase to DOD was reflected eariier because of the decHne 
of surplus refining capacity and the frequency and method by which DOD 
solicits competitive bids. Some airUnes were fortunate to have bought 
under multiyear contracts that resulted in lower average prices, even 
though surplus refining capacity was disappearing and petroleum export-
ing countries were setting higher crude oil prices. 
Diesel fuel prices as shown in table 3.9 increased dramatically more to 
DOD than shown in the PPI. Prices in cents-per-gallon are shown below. 
73-III 78-IV Difference 
PPI 13.8 38.7 24.9 
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The absolute difference in price changes between PPI and DOD is 
significant and represents the loss of surplus refining capacity. The price-
per-gallon differential in 78-1V is probably not significant. The DOD is 
no longer sought as a market to sell off production needed to keep 
refineries at full capacity. 
3.4.2 Citrus Fruits 
Citrus fruits have volatile price changes that are greatly influenced by 
the weather, season, and competitive markets. 
The PPI prices reflect only the spot market prices in Chicago and New 
York. Prices are taken from trade pubhcations on the Tuesday of the 
week containing the thirteenth of the month. The DOD price in contrast 
reflects both the spot and contract market throughout the United States. 
The DOD average price each quarter is a self-weighted average of prices 
paid in all geographical regions and types of transactions (spot, contract). 
The DOD price indexes are quarterly averages of the three months 
weighted by purchases in each month. The PPI quarterly average, in 
contrast, is an equally weighted average of spot market prices, for geo-
graphical points, on a single day. These differences in methods are 
significant because of the substantial swings in the price of these products 
over a three-month period. Price indexes and detailed specifications for 
citrus fruits are shown in tables 3.11 and 3.12, respectively. 
Figure 3.2 shows the movement of the two composite price indexes 
over time. The long-term trend is clearly evident, and the short-run 
differences in the magnitudes of price change are significant. The use of 
PPIs would generally have understated constant-dollar citrus purchases 
because the price index is generally greater than that shown for DOD 
purchase prices. 
3.4.3 Clothing 
Comparisons for groups of clothing and footwear were made with 
similar PPI groupings. The composite indexes for men's apparel and 
footwear are shown on a fixed-weighted basis in table 3.13. The detailed 
specifications making up the two composite indexes are shown in table 
3.14. Figure 3.3 shows the price change of men's footwear in the PPI and 
DOD. 
An unpublished study by Allan Searle (1977) made an item-by-item 
comparison of DOD and PPI price indexes for similar clothing, textiles, 
and footwear. Searle found greater price dispersion of DOD apparel and 
footwear prices than was reflected in the PPI. He also found that substitu-
tion of DOD for PPI weights had no effect on PPIs. However, the 
substitution of PPI for DOD weights had an appreciable downward effect 
on the DOD indexes because of the impact of greater price dispersion of 
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Fig. 3.2 Comparison of price indexes for citrus fruit (July-September 
1973 = 100.0) 
Both the DOD and PPI indexes were put on a base of first quarter 
1972 = 100 to make them comparable. No attempt was made to weight 
similar specifications equally within the composites. Although the more 
rapid rise of DOD clothing prices cannot be attributed to any one factor, 
several influences were isolated. The DOD items frequently represented 
the purchase of a service, for example, the materials were supplied by 
DOD to the contractor who manufactured the shirt. The DOD series 
would then have a higher labor component than the PPI price, which 
includes the producers' cost of materials. 
Another factor is that DOD is required to purchase combat boots 
produced at certain federal prisons. In many cases, these prices were 
higher than bid prices from private producers, which accelerated the 
change in the price of footwear to DOD. 
If composite PPI indexes were used to deflate defense purchases, they 
would have overstated constant-dollar purchases of men's apparel in 
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Fig. 3,3 Comparison of price indexes for men's footwear (January-
March 1972 = 100.0) 
footwear seems unlikely to provide a correct estimate of constant-dollar 
purchases or price change. 
3.4.4 Hot Rolled Carbon Plate 
Hot rolled carbon plate is purchased by the DOD under a variety of 
detailed specifications. These specifications are shown in table 3.15. The 
prices for these various specifications were converted to a price per ton, 
and then a weighted average price for delivered hot rolled carbon plate to 
DOD was calculated. The PPI is a list price less usual discounts. The price 
change to DOD is greater for most periods for which data were available, 
as shown by the indexes in table 3.16 and figure 3.4. The Cost of Living 
Council also found that average realized prices for hot rolled carbon 
sheets increased more than those shown by the PPI (Council on Wage 
and Price Stability 1977, p. IV-19). 
Although the price change reflected in the DOD data is greater, the 
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Fig. 3.4 Comparison of price indexes for hot rolled carbon plate (Octo-
ber-December 1972=100.0) 
This is in sharp contrast to the petroleum products where base period 
average prices were significantly different. These average prices in dollars 
per 100 pounds are shown below for 1972-IV and 1977-1. 
PPI ($) DOD ($) Difference ($) 
72-IV 8.657 8.578 .079 
77-1 13.364 15.212 1.848 
The increase in DOD average prices does not seem due to a change in 
mix, that is, to the use of several national stock numbers (NSN) or the 
method used to combine them. This is supported in that the only product 
to be delivered in both 72-IV and 77-1 was NSN 9515-00-153-3310 and 
was close to the average. The differences appear more likely due to 
changes in discounts and extra charges which accompany changes in 
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3.4.5 Construction 
There is no reasonable comparison between the PPI and the DOD 
construction series. The PPI contains only price indexes of construction 
materials, while the DOD series includes the total construction cost 
(labor, materials, and overhead) and profit. There exist many other 
measures of price change for construction, most of which are based on 
input costs of materials and labor. The Engineering News Record Build-
ing Cost Index (ENR) is used by DOD as a guide in evaluating cost 
changes of military construction. The ENR index includes labor costs as 
well as materials costs (see table 3.17) but contains no adjustments for 
changes in labor productivity, competitive conditions, or other intangi-
bles. 
The ENR was rebased to 1972, and the DOD construction series was 
recalculated on a fixed-weight Laspeyres basis for comparison purposes 
(see fig. 3.5 and table 3,18). The two series show a remarkably similar 
trend over the entire period. There are, however, large differences in 
short-term changes, especially during 1973 and from mid-1977 to 
mid-1978. 
3.4.6 Summary of Detailed Comparisons 
Detailed comparisons of PPIs and DOD indexes have been made 
showing differences and similarities that are striking. The differences are 
short term, while the similarities are long term. The nature of the DOD 
market makes it likely that it will experience price changes that will be 
significantly different from these prevailing in the private sector. It seems 
obvious that the precision of short-term estimates of price change of 
defense purchases cannot be reliable unless actual DOD transactions are 
measured. 
3.5. Future Plans 
The direct pricing of DOD purchases for the purpose of deflating 
national defense in the NIP As has just begun. A set of historical statistics 
has been prepared and is updated on an ongoing basis. These data were 
fully incorporated into the December 1980 benchmark revision of the 
NIP As and are updated each quarter in the Survey of Current Business. 
The program is unique in many respects. One aspect is the effort to 
extract information from massive amounts of data on actual transactions 
contained on computer tapes. Such an approach is quite different from 
the usual manner in which price indexes are compiled, and the price data 
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Fig. 3.5 Comparison of price indexes for construction (calendar year 
1972 = 100.0) 
stood. More reUance is placed on conventions and edit steps, which arc 
established to process data and reveal problems with the basic inputs. 
Deflation of DOD purchases has been of primary interest in this 
project. However, there is no reason why the rest of government (i.e., 
federal, state, and local) cannot be directly priced and deflated. There is 
evidence that records or prices paid exist at all levels of government. Only 
the lack of resources prevents the assembly of an appropriate data base. 
Deflation at this time has been done primarily for the purpose of 
deflating the NIP As. Other users of statistics have interests that might be 
better served by price indexes based on approaches other than specifica-
tion pricing and aggregations other than the NIP As. Aggregations by 
appropriations or military force structures seem to have special appeal to 
the DOD. The future may well inaugurate a time when the price index 
techniques and principles will be known widely enough that individuals 
and organizations will create their own measures in order to facilitate 
their analysis. The Office of Management and Budget, for example, 
could examine budgets with much greater sophistication if programs were 
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costs of various programs (i.e., the research and development, produc-
tion, and maintenance) could all be integrated and deflated to reveal the 
true price change and cost of existing and planned programs. 
Individuals and organizations have reUed too long on existing price 
indexes. Indexes based upon government documents are attractive be-
cause they impose no direct paperwork or reporting burden on the 
private sector. The knowledge and resources are already in place to 
create comprehensive price indexes relating to government activity. Table 3.1  Relationship of National Defense Purchases to the GNF' 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1478 
$  I3 i  11 i  Q n  s 
GNFJ 
Govt. purchases goods and services 
Federal 
National defense 
1185.9  1326.4  1434.2  1549.2  1718.0  1918.0  2156.1 
253.1  270.4  304.1  339.9  362.1  394.5  432.6 
101.7  102.0  111.0  122.7  129.2  143.9  153.4 
73.1  72.8  77.0  83.0  86.0  93.3  100.0 
GNP 




100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
21.4  20.4  21.2  21.9  21.2  20.6  20.1 
8.6  7.7  7.7  7.9  7.5  7.5  7.1 
6.2  5.5  5.5  5.4  5.0  4.9  4.6 177 
Table 3.2  Department of Defense Purchases, NIPA Basis 
by  Mdor Type of Product ($Millions) 
Non- 
Calendar  Total  Durable  durable  Struc-  Compen- 
Year  Purchases  Goods  Goods  Services  tures  sation 
Current-Dollars 
1972  72,053  14,921  5,006  15,223 
1973  72,743  14,350  4,663  16,005 
1974  78,072  15,723  5,886  17,649 
1975  81,288  17,360  5,454  17,266 
1976  83,601  18,064  4,931  18,479 
1977  90,700  20,873  5,643  20,107 















Constant 1972 Dollars 
1972  72,053  14,921  5,006  15,223 
1973  68,268  13,938  4,107  15,115 
1974  67,845  14,737  3,595  15,172 
1975  65,259  15,113  2,941  13,214 
1976  63,160  14,588  2,531  13,026 
1977  63,925  15,443  2,646  13,051 















Implicit Price Deflators 
~~  ~  ~ 
1972  100.00  100.0 
1973  106.56  103.0 
1974  115.07  104.7 
1975  124.56  114.9 
1976  132.36  123.8 
1977  141.92  135.2 









100.0  100.0  100.0 
105.9  112.1  107.2 
116.3  122.9  113.4 
130.7  130.9  120.7 
141.9  141.7  127.0 
154.1  149.6  133.8 
163.7  161.1  142.7 L 
4 
W 
Table 3.3  Comparison of  Published Implicit Price Deflators and New Estimates Incorporating DOD Data 
Previously  1973  Previously  1974  Previously  1975 
Published  New  Differ-  Published  New  DilIer-  Published  New  Differ- 
Estimate  Estimate  ence  Estimate  Estimate  en=  Estimate  Estimate  ence 
Index Numbers,  1972= 100.0 
GNP 
Govt. purchases goods and services 
Federal 
Less compensation 
105.80  105.86  .06  116.02  115.95  -.07  127.15  127.02  -  .13 
106.7  107.0  .3  117.5  117.1  -.4  128.9  128.3  -  .6 
105.8  106.6  .8  115.9  115.1  -.a  127.5  125.9  -1.6 
104.0  105.4  1.4  219.0  117.1  -1.9  133.5  130.1  -3.4 
GNP 
Govt. purchases goods and services 
Federal 
Less compensation 
% Change from the Preceding Year 
5.8  5.9  .1  9.7  9.5  -  .2  9.6  9.5  -  .1 
6.7  7.0  .3  10.1  9.4  -  .7  9.7  9.6  -  .1 
5.8  6.6  .8  9.6  8.0  -1.6  10.0  9.4  -  .6 
4,o  5.4  1.4  14.4  11.1  -3.3  12.2  11.1  -  1.1 Previously  1976  Previously  1977  Previously 
Published  New  Differ-  Published  New  Differ-  Published  New  Differ. 
Estimate  Estimate  ence  Estimate  Estimate  ence  Estimate  Estimate  ence 
Index Numbers,  1972= 100.0 
GNP  133.76  133.70  -.06  141.61  141.64  .03  152.09  152.07  -  .02 
Federal  134.4  133.6  -.8  142.7  143.2  .5  153.3  153.0  -  .3 
Less compensation  140.3  138.7  -1.6  148.7  149.6  .9  160.8  160.2  -  .6 
Govt. purchases goods and services  136.8  136.5  -.3  146.3  146.5  .2  157.8  157.7  -  .1 
?i  Change from the Preceding Year 
GNP  5.2  5.3  .1  5.9  5.9  0  7.4  7.3  -  .1 
Federal  5.4  6.1  .7  6.2  7.2  1.0  7.4  6.8  -  .6 
Govt. purchases goods and services  6.1  6.4  .3  7.0  7.3  .J  7.9  7.6  -  .3 
Less  compensation  5.1  6.6  1.5  6.0  7.9  1.9  8.1  7.1  -  1.0 
Source: Bureau of  Economic Analysis. 









































Implicit Price Deflators for DOD Purchases 





















































































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note: The total for the aircraft category includes subcategories not shown separately for 
aircraft modifications, spare and repair parts, support equipment and facihties. Engineering 
services, other contractual services, and government-furnished materials are excluded from 
the aircraft category. 
^PreHminary. 181 
Table 3.5 Implicit Price Deflators for DOD Purchases of New Missiles 




































































































































































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note'. The total for the missile category includes missile modifications, spare and repair 
parts, support equipment and facilities which are not shown separately. Engineering and 
other contractual services, components produced in industrially funded activities, and the 
construction portion of the Minuteman force modernization program are excluded from the 
missiles category. 
^Preliminary. 182 
Table 3.6 Implicit Price Deflators for Compensation of DOD 




























































































































































































Implicit Price Deflators 


















































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note: The ship category also includes conversions at private shipyards and govern-
ment-furnished equipment for conversions. 
Preliminary. 184 
Table 3.8 Implicit Price Deflators for DOD Purchases 
of Structures and Military Construction (CY 1972 = 100) 
Calendar 
Year/ 












































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note: Structures include, in addition to military construction, family housing, missile silos, 
and net purchases of existing structures. 
^Preliminary. 185 


































































































































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 186 
Table 3.10 Petroleum Product Specifications 
Regular gasoline 
PPI 
PPI 05-71-02-03, gasoline, regular grade, monthly sales to commercial 
consumers 
DOD 
NSN 9130-00-160-1818, gasoline, automotive, combat type I, MIL-
G-3056, NATO code no. F-46, MGl 
Jet fuel 
PPI 
PPI 05-72-03-01, jet fuel, kerosene base, commercial type, monthly 
sales to airline industry, bonded fuel excluded 
DOD (JP-4) 
NSN 9130-00-256-8613, turbine fuel, aviation, grade JP-4, (naptha 
base), MIL-T-5624 
DOD (JP-5) 




PPI 05-73-03-01, diesel fuel, no. 2 or standard diesel, monthly sales to 
large consumers 
DOD 
NSN 9140-00-273-2377, diesel fuel, MIL-F-16884 (NATO symbol 
F-76) 























































































































































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Table 3.12  Citrus Fruit Specifications 
DOD 
NSN 8915-00-126-8804, oranges, fresh any variety except temple 
NSN 8915-00-582-4071, lemons, fresh 
NSN 8915-00-616-0198, grapefruit, fresh 
PPI 
01-11-01-01, grapefruit, Florida, white, seedless, sizes 32,36,40, N.Y. Auction, 4/5 
bushel 
01-11-01-04, lemons, California, sizes 115, 140, 165, half box, Chicago Auction 
marted 
01-11-01-11, oranges, California, Naval or Valencia, sizes 88 and 113, half box, 
Chicago Auction market 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 188 
























































































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 189 
Table 3.14  Men's Clothing and Footwear Specifications 
Men's Apparel 
DOD 
NSN 8405-00-082-6609, trousers utility cotton sateen, OG-107 
MIL-T-833 k (class 1) dtd 11 Feb 71 and am. #2 dated 16 Feb 72 
NSN 8405-00-614-9938, shirt, utility, durable press, army shade 507 
NSN 8405-00-935-2714, trouser, mens, poly/wool, tropical blue shade 3346, 
type 1, class 5 
NSN 8415-00-163-7701, trouser, food handlers, cotton drill white 
NSN 8415-00-177-4834, cap, hot weather, OG-106 
NSN 8415-00-268-7871, gloves, leather, work, cream heavy M-1950 
NSN 8415-00-394-3598, trousers, flying men's, cotton warp and nylon fining 
oxford USAF shade 1509, sage green (modified F-18) 
NSN 8415-00-491-2679, coveralls, flying men's cotton 
NSN 8415-00-634^4794, gloves, shell, leather, black M-1949 
NSN 8415-00-753-6483, coveralls, cold weather mechanics 
NSN 8415-00-782-2916, cap, cold weather (A-2) navy 
NSN 8415-00-904-5134, undershirt, men's winter lightweight 
NSN 8420-00-166-5850, drawers, men's ctn thigh length white type 1, class 1 
NSN 8420-00-543-6643, undershirt, man's ctn, quarter sleeve 
NSN 8440-00-872-2171, socks, men's, ctn/nyl/wl, OG-408, stretch type, cush. 
sole 20%/30%/50% 
PPI 
PPI 03-81-02 men's appareP 
Men's Footwear 
DOD 
NSN 8430-00-554-4228, shoe, dress, men's, black, oxford 
NSN 8430-00-620-0520, shoe, service, chukka 
NSN 8430-00-782-3077, boot, combat, men's leather, DMS 
PPI 
PPI 04-31 men's and boys' footwear^ 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
^These PPIs are based upon numerous eight-digit codes, roughly 18 for men's apparel and 
five for men's footwear in 1978. Prior to December 1977 there were about 27 eight-digit 
codes for men's apparel. The codes and their short descriptions can be seen in the appropri-
ate monthly Bureau of Labor Statistics report for Producers Prices and Price Indexes, 190 
Table 3.15 Hot Rolled Carbon Plate Product Specifications 
DOD 
NSN 9515-00-153-3183, steel plate, carbon, hot rolled, 10.2 Ib/sq ft, 60 inches wide x 
240 inches long, 1,020 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-15:3-3185, same as 3184 except 348-inch width, 60 inch long and 10.2 Ib/sq 
ft, 1,479 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3214, same as 3184 except 0.25 inch thick, 96 inches wide x 348 inches 
long, 2,368.6 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3223, same as 3184 except 15.30 Ib/sq ft, 60 inches x 240 inches long, 
1,530 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3224, same as 3184 except 15.3 Ib/sq ft, 60 inches x 348 inches long, 
0.375 inch thick, 2,218.5 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3236, same as 3184 except 0.500 inch thick, 60 inches wide x 240 
inches long, 2,042 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3255, same as 3184 except 0.75 inch thick, 60 inches wide x 240 inches 
long, 3,060 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3262, same as 3184 except 35.7 Ib/sq ft, 72 inches wide x 348 inches 
long, 6,212 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3264, same as 3184 except 1.0 inch thick, 60 inches wide x 240 inches 
long, 4,083 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3280, same as 3184 except 2.0 inches thick, 60 inches wide x 240 
inches long, 8,167.6 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3310, same as 3184 except 0.375 inch thick, 72 inches wide x 240 
inches long, 1,837 Ib/pm 
NSN 9515-00-153-3341, same as 3184, 30.6 Ib/sq ft, 96 inches wide x 240 inches long, 
4,896 Ib/pm 
PPI 
10-13-02-61, hot rolled carbon steel sheets, commercial quality, cut lengths, .1271 inch 
minimum (TMW) x 48 inches wide x 120 inches long, cut edge, not pickled, base 
chemistry, base quantity (40,000 or over of an item) mill to user, f.o.b. mill. 191 
Table 3.16 Hot Rolled Carbon Plate 
Calendar 
Year/ 























































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Table 3.17 Construction Specifications 
DOD. The nine classes of construction which comprise 
military construction are: 
1. Airfield pavements 
2. Training facilities 
3. Maintenance facihties 
4. Covered storage facihties 
5. Administrative buildings 
6. Troop housing 
7. Facihties for personnel support and services 
8. Research, development, and test buildings 
9. Roads and streets 
ENR. The ENR is based on four specifications: 
1. Structural steel shapes base mill price 
2. Bulk Portland cement, 20-city average 
3. 2 X 2 lumber, 20-city average 
4. Skilled labor, 20-city average 















































































































Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 193  Deflation of Defense Purchases 
Appendix A 
Relation of Unified Budget Outlays to NIPA Purchases for DOD and MAP 
The relationship between outlays in the unified budget and NIPA pur-
chases is determined by the definition and magnitude of the adjustments 
made for coverage and timing. This reconciliation is shown in table 3. A. 1 
for fiscal year 1974. 
Outlays require coverage adjustments for DOD outlays that are out-
side the scope of national defense purchases in the national accounts. 
These include net lending, payments to U.S. territories (geographical 
exclusions), foreign currency conversion, capital gains, land and netting 
Table 3.A.1 Relationship of DOD Outlays 
in Unified Budget and NIPA National Defense 
Fiscal Year 
1974 








Netting and grossing 
Timing: Progress payments 
Foreign military sales 
Accounting adjustments 
Equals NIPA DOD and MAP expenditures 
Less: 
Grants-in-aid to state and local governments 
Military retirement transfer payments 
Transfers to foreigners 
Net interest paid 
Subsidies less surplus PXs and commissary 
Equals NIPA DOD and MAP purchases 
Plus: 
Social Security 
Atomic Energy Activities 
General Service Administration sales 
Civil Service Commission 
Special programs 
Other agencies 
























Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 194 Richard C. Ziemer/Karl D. Galbraith 
and grossing. Timing adjustments to outlays to reflect current purchases 
are largely for the increase in advances net of payables (i.e., progress 
payments), foreign military sales, accounting adjustments, and Military 
Assistance Programs (MAP). 
DOD and MAP expenditures are further adjusted for transfer pay-
ments, which are not included in defense purchases in the NIP As, by 
removing grants-in-aid to state and local governments, military retire-
ment transfer payments, transfers to foreigners, net interest paid, and 
subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises (i.e., PXs and 
commissaries). 
NIPA DOD and MAP purchases are also adjusted for activities of 
other federal agencies that are included in the definition of national 
defense purchases. These include atomic energy activities by the Depart-
ment of Energy and sales by the General Service Administration. Small 
adjustments are also made for Social Security, Civil Service Commission, 
special programs, and other agencies. 
Appendix B 
Defense Price Index: Relative Importance 
of Purchases in Current Dollars 






Family housing construction 
Family housing improvements and minor construction 
Family housing maintenance 
Military construction 
Missile silos (force modernization 











Installation support services 
















































.003 Appendix B (continued) 
Equipment maintenance 
Housepeeking services 
Maintenance, repairs and minor construction of 
real property 
Rents 
Training and education 
Medical services 
Other services 
Automatic data processing contractual service 
Automatic data processing leased equipment 
Consulting, engineering, and technical services 
Indirect hire 
Miscellaneous services 
Printing and reproduction 
Research and development 























Air Force new aircraft 
Army new aircraft 
Modification equipment, spares, and support equipment 
Navy and Marine Corps new aircraft 
Ammunition plant modernization 







































































































.013 Appendix B (continued) 
Industrial funds purchases (durable goods) 





Air Force other missiles, 
Army and Marine Corps 
new missiles 
missiles, new missiles 
ICBM/SLBM new missiles 
Modification equipment, 









New ship construction 
New ship GFE 
Ship conversion 










spares, and support equipment 
' missiles 
Defense stock funds (nondurable goods) 
Bulk petroleum 
Clothing and textiles 
Other nondurables 
Subsistence 















































































= less than .0005. 197  Deflation of Defense Purchases 
Appendix C 














Research and development 
Ship construction 
Stock funds: defense stock fund 
Stock funds: military services 
Transportation of things 































Guidelines for Quality Adjusting Aircraft 
Quality changes for which price adjustments were made include all 
physical changes that have cost and performance consequences. 
Improved performance is recognized as an enhancement of the air-
craft's mission, for example, close air support, electronic warfare, anti-
submarine warfare. It assumes that expected or specified performance 
characteristics are associated with the physical configuration of aircraft in 
production. The remedy of unexpected physical defects is considered 
price increases and not quality improvements because production aircraft 
are expected to fit together properly and to work. Aircraft enter produc-
tion after considerable research and development that includes full-scale 
development models and prototypes. 198 Richard C. Ziemer/Karl D. Galbraith 
A. QuaHty adjustments are made for: 
1. Changes in design or materials which change the aircraft's 
a) Length of service 
b) Need for repairs 
c) Ease of repair 
d) Weight 
e) Quality of materials in relation to their function 
2. Changes in mechanical features that affect the aircraft's 
a) Overall operation 
b) Efficiency 
c) Ability of a component to perform 
3. Engineering changes that affect the aircraft's probability of 
mechanical failure with respect to particular systems 
4. Safety features, for example, better seat ejection systems 
5. Antipollution, noise abatement equipment, etc., installed for 
norimiUtary objectives 




3. Design solely to make the aircraft seem new or different 
4. Comfort 
5. Convenience 
6. Remedy of production compatability deficiencies 
C. New technology may make it possible to achieve recognizably 
better quahty at lower cost. No satisfactory technique has been 
developed for adjusting for quahty change in such situations. 
Therefore, rather than reflect erroneous quality deterioration no 
adjustments were made. Prices before and after the change are 
directly compared in order to give at least partial credit for quahty 
improvement. 
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Comment Marilyn E. Manser 
In their paper, Ziemer and Galbraith discuss the deflation of defense 
purchases. The recent pubhcation of implicit price deflators (IPD) for 
Department of Defense (DOD) purchases of goods and services is the 
culmination of an effort which began in 1973. (Commerce 1979). A 
forthcoming article in the Survey of Current Business will present the IPD 
for all defense purchases based on these new price data, and they will be 
Marilyn E. Manser is senior economist at Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 200 Richard C. Ziemer/Karl D. Galbraith 
fully incorporated into the national income and product accounts (NIPA) 
at the time of the next benchmark revision. 
The importance to budget planning and to public policy debate of 
satisfactory constant-dollar measures of total government expenditures 
for various types of defense purchases needs no comment. A project 
similar to this one for nondefense purchases would clearly be desirable, 
and, as the authors note, it could be done in a manner similar to this one. 
But before doing so, attention should be paid to evaluating the results of 
this project. 
By far the major portion of the Ziemer-Galbraith paper, specifically 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3, is devoted to summarizing the results of the project 
to develop deflators for defense purchases and to describing in detail the 
construction of the deflators for certain categories of defense expendi-
tures. Much of this material is presented elsewhere (Commerce 1979) and 
will, it is hoped, be readily available from government sources to users of 
these deflators. It is useful that such extensive discussion of methodology 
and data has been provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
on these indexes; however, this conference paper would, in my opinion, 
have been more usefully devoted to comprehensive analysis of the im-
portance of the various issues and problems noted below for the resulting 
measures. 
The first thing to think about in assessing these new IPDs is what 
questions we want to ask about price increases for defense and how useful 
this new index is for answering them. Ideally, we might want to have a 
deflator for the output of national defense. Appropriately, constructing 
such an index was ruled out for the present because of the problems of 
measuring ''national defense." Clearly, measuring the output of non-
defense government goods would also be highly complex, and the 
approach taken here is consistent with the usual treatment of government 
in the NIPA. 
The authors say that the results of this project are instead measures of 
the real volume of inputs used to provide national defense. That does 
seem to be an appropriate construct to measure for defense. The compo-
nents of DOD purchases are labor compensation and material goods in 
various states of production (However, the theoretical construct that an 
implicit price deflator is generally taken to correspond to is not an input 
price index [Fisher and Shell 1972, pp. 49-59].) 
Previous work on price measurement has identified a number of 
methodological and statistical problems. One methodological problem 
given a great deal of attention in previous work on price measurement is 
the choice of the form of the index. (Presumably, as has been done 
recently in the Survey of Current Business for the major category IPDs, 
alternative index formulations will eventually be presented for defense 201 Deflation of Defense Purchases 
purchases.) Other major problems and issues concern choice of transac-
tion versus Hst prices, sample selections, timing problems, quality change 
and introduction of new goods.^ Choices that were employed in this 
project are described, but more discussion of their rationale and alterna-
tives considered would have been useful. Choices made regarding use of 
specification pricing and treatment of quahty change and introduction of 
new goods are akin to those used for the PPL This effort to construct a 
deflator for DOD purchases attempts to obtain exclusively transaction 
prices. No consistent criteria for sample size were appHed. Section 3.2 of 
this paper considered in detail the measurement of prices for five catego-
ries. For aircraft, missiles, and ship construction, the sample coverage of 
prices was extremely high. Thus, while there may be a problem of 
inefficiency, there is unhkely to be a problem of their being misrepre-
sentative. For compensation, collection of wage data was comprehensive 
and straightforward. However, for construction, the price coverage was 
erratic. 
The problems that arise with respect to aircraft and missiles, both of 
which are included in the NIP As on a delivery basis, are similar to one 
another. The major conceptual problem arising here is the method of 
hnking into the index a new aircraft or missile which is intended to replace 
an older type. The conceptually appropriate measure of the price of the 
old type to use for the link is the marginal cost of the last unit produced; 
the choice made here, to use ''one of the last old aircraft model units," is 
therefore reasonable. In order for the state of technology to be compara-
ble, the choice was made to price the new unit at the point at which the 
new learning curve reaches the flattening out stage; a reference or discus-
sion in the paper to explain and justify the method used to estabUsh the 
learning curve estimate used for new models would have been helpful. 
It is well known that in price index construction the choice of the base 
year will generally affect the values. Here, for aircraft and missiles, the 
base year is especially important. This is because high base year prices 
that occur for items produced early in their respective learning curves 
can, as noted by the authors on page 152, cause the base year prices to be 
exceptionally high on average and thus to overstate the constant dollar 
value of subsequent deliveries of the item. It would have been useful if 
the authors could have included, in addition to their verbal discussion, 
some calculations of how different these price indexes would have been if 
(1) a different base year has been chosen, or (2) a different method of 
handling the problem had been adopted. 
For the ship construction category, the approach taken is to pick a 
particular physical design of a ship and use it as the specification to reprice 
over time at shipyards. The nature of the item does seem to warrant a 
somewhat different treatment than that employed for aircraft and mis-202 Richard C. Ziemer/Karl D. Galbraith 
siles, which are produced in larger quantities of identical products. 
Nonetheless, more frequent change of ship design than that mentioned— 
10 years—^would seem to be clearly desirable. 
On the surface, the development of a price index for defense might be 
thought to entail special measurement problems and methodological 
issues only for those defense goods which have no counterpart in the 
civilian marketplace. Consequently, the authors' comparison in Section 
3.4 of the IPD for selected DOD goods for which markets may be the 
same as for nondefense goods with what appears to be a corresponding 
PPI is very useful. (In fact, these comparisons are the major contribution 
of this paper, since the description of this new IPD series has been 
released elsewhere.) 
For this purpose, the DOD price data are used to construct a Laspeyres 
index which is then compared to the PPI. Thus, the discrepancy caused by 
use of different index formulations is removed. It would also be interest-
ing to see a comparison of the DOD Laspeyres index with the IPD, but 
the IPDs for the categories on which the DOD-PPI comparisons are 
made are not published separately in the BE A reports. (This raises the 
question of whether the DOD coverage for these categories is sufficient 
to make the comparisons undertaken in Section 3.4 statistically 
meaningful.) 
Assuming that the indexes for these selected defense categories are 
statistically reUable, I would state their conclusion somewhat more 
strongly than they did—the DOD and PPI price series are quite different. 
Although they find one similar pair, namely, the DOD index for military 
construction and the PPI for construction, as they note, the DOD index is 
much more comprehensive, since the latter measures only the price of 
construction materials. Thus, these data provide no evidence that the 
DOD and PPI prices are the same for comparable categories. 
Other categories of market goods they consider are three types of fuel, 
four types of citrus fruits, men's apparel and men's footwear, and hot 
rolled carbon plate. Only for one of these categories—that for men's 
footwear—do the two indexes show a nearly identical change over the 28 
quarters for which the data are given (1972-1 to 1978-IV), and even for 
that category one cannot say the indexes are similar, since some of the 
movements within that period are considerably different. 
Prior to discussing sources of differences in the DOD and PPI indexes 
for specific categories, the authors note that the DOD measurement of 
prices as the average of many transactions over a quarter, and the 
measurement of prices for many categories of the PPI on the basis of 
prices on a single day of each month, provide a general source of dis-
crepancies. Similarly, sources of discrepancies they note with respect to 
specific categories—for example, the exclusive use of spot prices in 
particular markets versus an average of types of transactions (spot and 203 Deflation of Defense Purchases 
contract) in many geographic areas for the period of interest—are general 
issues in price measurement. Presumably, they have concluded that these 
sources of differences are important only for those categories where they 
are specifically noted, but a more unified framework for discussing 
sources of differences would help the assessment. 
Other types of discrepancies noted by the authors arise from special 
aspects of DOD purchasing; an example of this is the requirement that 
DOD make certain purchases from noncompetitive suppliers, for exam-
ple, the purchase of combat boots produced at federal prisons. An 
attempt to assess the quantitative importance of this factor would be 
useful.^ 
The final source of discrepancies they discuss from use of different 
weights for the two indexes. The authors cite an unpublished study by 
Allan Searle which found that substitution of PPI for DOD weights had 
an appreciable downward effect on the DOD indexes for clothing. Such a 
comparison would be useful here for other categories. 
Notes 
1. For a detailed discussion of problems in price measurement see, e.g., Triplet! (1975). 
2, If a large portion of expenditures on combat boots is in fact a subsidy to federal 
prisons, then that component might more appropriately be included elsewhere in the 
accounts. In any case, it is not clear that this should result in consistently higher price 
increases than faced for privately produced boots, even though the price level may be 
higher. 
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